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INTRODUCTION 
On 16 March 2011, Algirdas Semeta, the Commissioner for Taxation 
and Customs Union, presented to the public a proposal for a Council directive 
on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).1 The CCCTB 
project has been one of the Commission’s political aims since 2001, when it 
issued a communication to the Council, the Parliament and the Economic and 
Social  Committee  on  an  “internal  market  without  tax  obstacles”,2  which 
accompanied  a  comprehensive  study  by  the  Commission’s  services  on 
“company taxation in the internal market”.3 In 2004, the CCCTB Working 
Group  was  established.4  As  a  result  of  the  group’s  work,  more  than  60 
working papers on technical elements of the CCCTB were published on the 
Commission’s website,5 laying the groundwork for the final proposal.6           
The co-existence of twenty-seven direct tax regimes is seen as one of 
the major trade barriers still left in the EU.7 Yet little progress has been made 
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1 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base’ COM (2011) 121/4. 
2 European Commission, ‘Towards an Internal Market without Tax Obstacles  A strategy 
for  providing  companies  with  a  Consolidated  Corporate  Tax  Base  for  their  EU-wide 
activities’ COM (2001) 582 final. 
3 European Commission,  ‘Company Taxation in the Internal Market’ (Commission Staff 
Working Paper) SEC (2001) 1681. 
4 The CCCTB working group comprises representatives from all member states and is chaired 
by the Commission (Parillo, ‘The CCCTB   Where Are We Now?’ [2011] Tax Notes 
International 471. 
5 
<http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/common_tax_base/index_en.
htm>, accessed 16 January 2012. 
6  See  Förster,  Krauß,  'Der  Richtlinienvorschlag  der  Europäischen  Kommission  zur 
Gemeinsamen  konsolidierten  Körperschaftsteuer-Bemessungsgrundlage  (GKKB)  vom 
16.3.2011' [2011] Internationales Steuerrecht 607. 
7 Munin, ‘Tax in Troubled Time: Is It the Time for A Common Corporate Tax Base in the 
EU?’ [2011] EC Tax Review 121. 2  Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics  [Vol 1:2 
when it comes to harmonization in the arena of direct taxation.8 Exceptions  
though limited in scope  are, for example, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive,9 
the  Merger  Directive 10  and  the  Interest  and  Royalties  Directive. 11 
Furthermore,  the  European  Court  of  Justice  has  exerted  some  indirect 
pressure on member states to harmonize their different corporate tax systems 
by eliminating their discriminatory aspects.12 The current CCCTB proposal 
tries to overcome this trade barrier in a single blow.13 The approach follows 
a  three-step  process. 14  First,  the  tax  bas e  of  European  companies  is 
determined by a single set of rules. Second, the amount of taxable profits of 
corporate groups is reached by consolidating the tax bases of the individual 
group members. Third, the overall profits are allocated to those member states 
in which the group is active. Here, the allocated profits are taxed at national 
tax rates. The allocation mechanism is based on a fixed apportionment 
formula. Thus, the CCCTB would  at least within the EU: reduce compliance 
costs  for  taxpayers;  increase  transparency;  eliminate  the  problem  of 
international  double  taxation  and  non-taxation  (due  to  divergent 
qualifications and the troublesome documentation of transfer prices); make 
possible  cross-border  loss  offsetting;  and  simplify  cross-border 
restructuring.15  Nevertheless, political support for the project in member 
states is low. This article analyses a Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB), 
which is to say, a common set of rules for determining the tax base that 
functions  as  an  interim  alternative  to  a  CCC TB  without  the  need  for 
consolidation and formula apportionment. At a later date, the common tax 
base can be supplemented by the second and third steps described above.16 
 
 
I. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF A CCTB AND AGAINST 
CONSOLIDATION 
 
A. Political feasibility 
Since  all  decisions  concerning  direct  taxes  at  EU  level  generally 
require a unanimous vote17 – any member state can veto the adoption of the 
CCCTB proposal – it is not likely that the “full package” of its provisions will 
                                                 
8 See Vascega, Thiel van, ‘The CCCTB Proposal: The Next Step towards Corporate Tax 
Harmonization in the European Union?’ [2011] European Taxation 374. 
9 Council Directive 90/436/EEC [1990]. 
10 Council Directive 90/434/EEC [1990]. 
11 Council Directive 2003/49/EC [2003]. 
12  See  Rödder,  ‘Wo  steht  und  wohin  entwickelt  sich  das  Europäische 
Unternehmenssteuerrecht?’ in Kessler, Förster, Watrin (eds), Festschrift Herzig (C.H. Beck 
2010) 352ff. 
13 Herzig, ‘Vorschlag einer GKKB-RL  ein ambitioniertes Zukunftsprojekt’ [2011] Der 
Betrieb M1. 
14 See Kahle, Dahlke, Schulz, ‘Der EU-Richtlinienvorschlag zur CCCTB – Anmerkungen 
aus Theorie und Praxis’ [2011] Die Unternehmensbesteuerung  491. 
15  See  Rödder,  Wo  steht  und  wohin  entwickelt  sich  das  Europäische 
Unternehmenssteuerrecht?’ (n 12) 359. 
16  See  Herzig,  Stock,  ‘Entwicklungen  der  Organschaft  und  Zukunftsperspektiven  einer 
Gruppenbesteuerung’ [2011] Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis  478ff. 
17 Art. 115 TFEU (OJ C115/47), Art. 5 para. 1 TEU (OJ C115/1). 2011]  DIRECT TAXATION IN THE EU: THE COMMON 
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come into effect soon.18 In particular, this supposition is supported by the 
results of the subsidiarity and proportionality test outlining member states’ 
opposition  to  the  CCCTB  proposal.19  In fact, nine National Parliaments 
reacted swiftly (the lower house of the Czech Parliamen t belatedly) to the 
adoption of the proposal by the Commission and sent their reasoned opinions 
of the proposal's non-compliance with the principles of subsidiarity 20 and 
proportionality21.22  This  group  included  Bulgaria,  Ireland,  Malta,  the 
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom.23  Concerning  their  subsidiarity  claim,  they  argue  that  the 
Commission failed to provide sufficient quantitative and qualitative evidence 
showing that member states were unable to remove fiscal imp ediments to 
cross-border activity on their own and that action at the EU level was 
necessary.24 They hint at the additional compliance costs for businesses and 
administrative costs for member states that would come along with the 
introduction of an optional CCCTB, adding a 28 th domestic corporate tax 
system. Furthermore, they also claim that the proportionality principle has 
been violated. In their opinion, bilateral and unilateral measures, as well as 
informal coordination, suffice in addressing cross-border tax problems. Other 
member states disapprove of at least some parts of the CCCTB proposal. 
Among those are Belgium, France, Italy, Lithuania and Germany.25A way to 
circumvent the unanimity requirement of Art. 115 TFEU as the legal basis for 
the proposal is through the enhanced cooperation of a smaller group of 
interested member states. However, the utilization of this instrument is in turn 
subject to a range of conditions not easily met. 26 What’s more, if several 
member states decide to move forward under the Lisbon Treaty articles on 
enhanced cooperation, it is more likely that they will attempt to introduce a 
CCTB in lieu of a CCCTB. The reason for this lies first and foremost in 
budgetary concerns.27 Many member states fear a loss in tax revenues because 
of a bias in the consolidation and formula apportionment mechanism. Since 
intangible and financial assets are excluded from the formula, states with 
large service industries were put at a disadvantage, while those with labour-
intensive  economies  reap  additi onal  benefits.  For  instance,  the  Federal 
Government of Germany rejects a CCCTB, but welcomes a CCTB.28 On 16 
August  2011  French  President  Nicolas  Sarkozy  and  German  Federal 
Chancellor Angela Merkel announced at a meeting in Paris that both states 
                                                 
18 See Rödder, ‘Einführung einer neuen Gruppenbesteuerung an Stelle der Organschaft’ 
[2011] Die Unternehmensbesteuerung  489. 
19 See Vascega, Thiel van (n 8) 377ff. 
20 Art. 5 para. 3 TEU. 
21 Art. 5 para. 4 TEU. 
22 The opinions can be  retrieved from the inter -parliamentary EU information exchange 
system, available at <http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/home/home.do> accessed 16 January 
2012. 
23 For a detailed account of the individual opinions of the National Parliaments see Brocke 
von,  Rottenmoser,  ‘Harmonisierung  direkter  Steuern?  Die  GKKB  im  Lichte  der 
Rechtsetzungskompetenzen der EU‘ [2011 ] Internationale Wirtschaftsbriefe 620ff. 
24 See Vascega, Thiel van (n 8) 378. 
25 Brocke von, Rottenmoser (n 23) 623. 
26 Vascega, Thiel van (n 8) 381. 
27 ibid 380. 
28 See Bundestags-Drucksache 17/5748 of 5 May 2011, 2. 4  Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics  [Vol 1:2 
intend to introduce a common set of rules to determine the tax base by the 
year 2013.29 Although some of the main objectives of the CCCTB project 
were not achieved this way   e.g. the elimination of the transfer pricing 
procedures, cross-border loss offsetting and simplification of cross-border 
restructuring  there would still be a worthwhile decrease in compliance and 
administrative  costs,  enhanced  transparency  concerning  international 
investments and a disappearance of international double taxation and non-
taxation due to divergent qualifications.30 
B. Unitary taxation as a panacea? Some caveats 
Political feasibility is not the only thing that speaks against a CCCTB 
and for a CCTB; there is a range of other considerations as well. In fact, it is 
likely that international tax planning under a formula apportionment regime 
will only shift from transfer pricing to a tax-optimal geographic allocation 
and the manipulation of formula factors;31 this is especially likely if national 
tax rates differ significantly, as intended by the CCCTB proposal.32 Economic 
distortions and perceptions of unfairness will be the consequence, 33 all the 
more so when the same formula is applied to all industries. 34  It is very 
doubtful that factors can be selected to adequately represent the generation of 
income – factors that are under the influence of the taxpayer, but at the same 
time neither distort economic decisions nor are prone to manipulation.35The 
formula of the CCCTB proposal relies on three equally weighted micro -
economic factors: labour36, assets37 and sales38.39 Each of these is susceptible 
to manipulation.40 The labour factor could either be influenced by actively 
managing the exclusion or inclusion of the work force into the factor or by 
governing the geographical distribution of the work force. The capital factor 
is particularly vulnerable to manipulation of reference date, i.e. shifting parts 
of the tax base to low-tax member states by selling or purchasing assets within 
the group prior to the end of the tax year. The degree to which the sales factor 
                                                 
29 Berschens, Hoppe, ‘Merkel und Sarkozy – einig wie nie‘ Handelsblatt (Düsseldorf, 17 
August 2011) 12. 
30 Herzig, Stock ( 16) 479; Mintz, ‘Corporate Tax Harmonization in Europe: It’s All About 
Compliance‘ [2004] International Tax and Public Finance  221ff. 
31 See Oestreicher, ‘Konzernbesteuerung in Europa  Zum Vorschlag einer konsolidierten 
körperschaftsteuerlichen  Bemessungsgrundlage  für  die  grenzüberschreitende 
Unternehmenstätigkeit in der EU’ [2011] Steuer und Wirtschaft 354. 
32 See CCCTB proposal (n 1), art. 103. 
33  Weiner,  ‘The  European  Union  and  Formula  Apportionment:  Caveat  Emptor’  [2011] 
European Taxation 381. 
34 The apportionment formula of the CCCTB proposal (n 1) accounts for the specifics of 
some industries (see arts. 98-101). 
35  Herzig,  Teschke,  Joisten,  ‘Between  Extremes:  Merging  the  Advantages  of  Separate 
Accounting and Unitary Taxation’ [2010] Intertax  334. 
36 The labour factor is split equally between payroll costs and the number of employees 
(CCCTB proposal (n 1), art. 90, para 1). 
37 The asset factor consists of all fixed tangible assets owned, rented or leased by a group 
member; as a proxy for intangible assets, R&D, m arketing and advertising costs in the six 
years prior to a company entering into the CCCTB are also to be included for five years 
(CCCTB proposal, art. 92). 
38 The sales factor includes the proceeds of all sales of goods and supplies of services after 
discounts and returns (CCCTB proposal, art. 95, para. 2). 
39 ibid, art. 86. 
40 See Herzig, Teschke, Joisten (n 35) 339ff. 2011]  DIRECT TAXATION IN THE EU: THE COMMON 
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can be manipulated depends on whether sales are recorded at destination or 
origin as it is more difficult to manipulate the country of destination than the 
country of origin. Needless to say, the CCCTB proposal contains a catalogue 
of countermeasures to prevent this kind of manipulation. For instance, the 
labor factor includes employees who, although not employed directly by a 
group  member,  perform  tasks  similar  to  those  performed  by  direct 
employees.41  Likewise,  assets  are  computed  as  an  average. 42  Sales are 
recorded at destination.43 Nonetheless, precautions and anti-abuse rules like 
these increase complexity and will probably not be an airtight guarantee 
against manipulation, always leaving some leeway for tax planning. Hence, 
member states cannot be criticized for taking a “buyer beware approach” to 
formula apportionment.44 
 
 
II. THE CCCTB PROPOSAL: COMMON TAX BASE45 
 
A.  No linkage to financial accounting 
The CCCTB proposal defines the tax base completely on its own.46 In 
spite of the huge array of literature on aligning financial and tax accounting 
that has been published during the last decade,47 it depends neither on a formal 
linkage nor on any other reference to national GAAP or IFRS / IAS.48 Whilst 
reference to local GAAP had the advantage that recourse could be taken to 
already existing legislature and jurisprudence, a fragmentation of the tax base 
into 27 single systems would almost inevitably be the consequence, and 
                                                 
41 CCCTB proposal (n 1), art. 91 para. 3. 
42 ibid, art. 94. 
43 According to art. 96 para. 1 CCCTB proposal, sales of goods shall be included in the sales 
factor of the Member State where dispatch or transport of the goods to the person acquiring 
them ends. 
44 Weiner (n 33) 381. 
45  For  a  detailed  discussion  see  Herzig,  Kuhr,  ‘Grundlagen  der  steuerlichen 
Gewinnermittlung nach dem GKKB-Richtlinienentwurf’ [2011] Der Betrieb 2053ff. 
46 Marx, ‘Die Gewinnermittlungskonzeption der GKKB nach dem Richtlinienentwurf der 
EU-Kommission’ [2011] Deutsche Steuerzeitung 550. 
47 See for example Macdonald, ‘The Taxation of Business Income  –  Aligning Taxable 
Income  with  Accounting  Income’  (2002)  TLRC  Discussion  Paper  No.  2 
<http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/dp2.pdf>  accessed  16  January  2012;  Schneider, 
‘Problemfelder  und  Methoden  des  Rechnungswesens  allgemein  und  einer 
Konzernrechnungslegung  als  international  Gewinnsteuerbemessungsgrundlage  im 
Besonderen’ [2003] Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis 652ff; Herzig, Gellrich, 
Jensen,  Nissen,  ‘IAS/IFRS  und  steuerliche  Gewinnermittlung’  [2004] 
Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis 550ff; Freedman, ‘Aligning Taxable Profits 
and  Accounting  Profits’  (2004)  2    no.1  eJournal  of  Tax  Research  71ff. 
<http://denning.law.ox.ac.uk/tax/documents/Freedman-
Aligning_taxable_profitsEjournal.pdf> accessed 16 January 2012; Herzig, ‘IAS/IFRS und 
steuerliche  Gewinnermittlung’  [2005]  Die  Wirtschaftsprüfung  (WPg)  211ff;  Mössner, 
‘Internationale Rechnungslegung und steuerliche Gewinnermittlung‘ in Ebke et. al. (eds), 
Internationale Rechnungslegungsstandards für börsenunabhängige Unternehmen? (Nomos 
2007) 165ff; Freedman, ‘Financial and Tax Accounting’ in Schön (ed), Tax and Corporate 
Governance (Springer 2008) 71ff. 
48  Scheffler,  Krebs ,  ‘Richtlinienvorschlag  zur  CCCTB,  Bestimmung  der 
Steuerbemessungsgrundlage im Vergleich mit der Steuerbilanz nach EstG’ [2011] Deutsches 
Steuerrecht  (Beihefter zu Heft 22) 14ff. 6  Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics  [Vol 1:2 
would thwart the aim of harmonization.49 Therefore, such an approach should 
be rejected when simplification through harmonization is the main goal, as is 
the case with a CCTB. Although IFRS / IAS would provide a common 
reference  point,  they  must  be  excluded  for  various  other  reasons. 50For 
starters, the vast majority of European companies do not draw up annual IFRS 
/ IAS accounts, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SME).51 For 
these companies, it would probably be easier to adopt an entirely new tax base 
like the one outlined in the CCCTB proposal than to adjust to the complex 
system of IFRS / IAS. 52 In addition, the possibility of a private standard -
setting body having an indirect effect on the tax base despite the comitology 
procedure clashes with the rule of law and the principle of democracy. 53 In 
similar fashion, the divergent g oals of the IFRS / IAS and taxation seem 
irreconcilable.54 Finally, and in the interest of IFRS / IAS themselves, the “tax 
pollution” of financial accounting should be fended off.55 In conclusion, it is 
to be welcomed that the CCCTB proposal only bespeaks of an adoption of 
IFRS / IAS ideas deemed by the European Commission to be in line with the 
goals of the project: financial assets and liabilities held for trading (Art. 23), 
long-term contracts (Art. 24), provisions (Arts. 25, 26) and accounting for 
leases (Art. 36).56  
 
B.  Profit and loss approach 
According  to  Art.  10  of  the  CCCTB  proposal,  the  tax  base  is 
calculated  as  the  difference  between  taxable  revenues  and  deductible 
expenses as well as other deductible expenses. In accordance with Art. 17, 
revenues, deductible expenses and other deductible expenses shall in general 
be recognized when they accrue or are incurred. Two important conclusions 
can be drawn from this. First, profits are not determined on a cash basis.57 
Instead there is a clear commitment to the  accrual principle.58 Second, the 
Commission chose the profit and loss approach over the balance sheet 
method.59 The latter calculates taxable income by comparing the value of the 
assets in the balance sheet at the end of the period  plus dividends distributed 
                                                 
49 Spengel, Malke, ‘Comprehensive Tax Base or Residual Reference to GAAP or Domestic 
Tax Law?’ in Lang, Pistone, Schuch, Staringer (eds), CCCTB (Linde 2008) 87. 
50  See  also  Kahle,  Schulz,  ‘Harmonisierung  der  steuerlichen  Gewinnermittlung  in  der 
Europäischen Union’ [2011] Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis 461ff. 
51  CCCTB  Wo rking  Group,   ‘CCCTB:  possible  elements  of  a  technical  outline’ 
CCCTB/057/doc/en of 26 July 2007, 5. 
52 Mors, Rautenstrauch, ‘Die GKKB als harmonisiertes Körperschaftsteuerrecht der Zukunft’ 
[2008] Die Unternehmensbesteuerung 98. 
53  See  Herzig,  Bär,  ‘Die  Zukunft  der  steuerlichen  Gewinnermittlung  im  Licht  des 
europäischen Bilanzrechts’, [2003] Betriebs-Berater 4 
54  See  Fülbier,  ‘Systemtauglichkeit  der  International  Financial  Reporting  Standards  für 
Zwecke der steuerlichen Gewinnermittlung’ [2006] Steuer und Wirtschaft 236ff. 
55 See Schön, ‘International Accounting Standards   A “Starting Point” for a Common 
European Tax Base?’ [2004] European Taxation 429ff. 
56 Prinz, ‘Richtlinienvorschlag der EU – Das europäische GKKB-Projekt – eine Einschätzung 
aus Beratersicht’ [2011] Steuer und Bilanzpraxis 463. 
57 Scheffler, Krebs (n 48) 15. 
58 See also CCCTB proposal (n 1), arts 18-19. 
59 For an introduction into the concept of the tax balance sheet see CCCTB Working Group, 
‘Concept of the “tax balance sheet”’ CCCTB/WP/16/doc/en of 7 September 2005. See also 
Schön  (ed),  Steuerliche  Maßgeblichkeit  in  Deutschland  und  Europa  (Verlag  Dr.  Otto 
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by the taxpayer and minus increases in capital during the year  with the value 
of net assets in the balance sheet at the end of the previous year.60 
Both approaches, the profit and loss technique and the balance sheet 
method, are in many respects similar and lead  ceteris paribus to the same 
results. However, the balance sheet method usually starts with the financial 
accounts balance sheet, whereas the profit and loss method supposedly either 
uses the profit and loss account as a starting point or calculates revenues and 
expenses directly for tax purposes.61 Although the tax base of the CCCTB 
proposal  could  in  theory  be  calculated  independently  from  finan cial 
accounting, in practice it is very likely that the balance sheet as well as the 
profit and loss account will serve as a starting point. 62 This assumption can 
be corroborated by an examination of the CCCTB proposal’s explicit and 
implicit  documentation  requirements,  to  whose  fulfillment  especially  the 
financial account balance sheet lends itself as a starting point.63 For example, 
costs relating to acquisition, construction or improvement are not deductible 
in the year the asset is acquired, constructed o r improved. Instead, only a 
proportional deduction may be made in respect of the depreciation of fixed 
assets64  and  costs  related  to  non -depreciable  assets  are  generally  only 
deductible in the tax year in which the assets are disposed of. 65 These costs 
must thus be recorded.66 Concerning stocks and work-in-progress, deductible 
expenses for a tax year shall be increased by the value of stocks and work-in-
progress at the beginning of the tax year and reduced by the value of those at 
the end of the same tax year.67 This way, the expenses relating to stocks and 
work-in-progress are only deductible when the latter are sold or used, again 
requiring an auxiliary calculation. Moreover, the same also applies to the 
simulation of the expense impact of provisions by Art.  25 of the CCCTB 
proposal.68 Finally, it should be noted that the proposal tries to cover every 
aspect of the tax base, 69  which means that there are many tax -specific 
provisions necessitating modifications when adopting results from financial 
accounting. This includes rules on exempt revenues (Art. 11), non-deductible 
expenses (Art.  14), expenditure incurred for the benefit of shareholders 
(Art. 15), transactions between associated enterprises (Arts. 78-79) as well as 
anti-abuse rules (Arts. 80-83). 
 
C.  Role of principles 
At  one  of  the  initial  meetings  of  the  CCCTB  Working  Group  a 
working paper titled “General Tax Principles” was presented and discussed.70 
                                                 
60 CCCTB Working Group, ‘Taxable income’ CCCTB/WP/17/doc/en of 7 September 2005, 
3. 
61 ibid. 
62 Prinz, ‘Richtlinienvorschlag der EU – Das europäische GKKB-Projekt – eine Einschätzung 
aus Beratersicht’ [2011] Steuer und Bilanzpraxis 463. 
63 See also Marx (n 46) 547. 
64 CCCTB proposal (n 1), arts 13, 32-42. 
65 ibid, art. 20. 
66 Together with the relevant date (ibid, art 32). 
67 ibid, art. 21. 
68 More precisely: CCCTB proposal, art. 25, para 1 (3). 
69 Vascega, Thiel van (n 8) 376. 
70 CCCTB Working Group, ‘General Tax Principles’ CCCTB/WP/001Rev1\doc\en of 10 
December 2004. 8  Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics  [Vol 1:2 
It outlined a wide range of general principles for the design and assessment 
of tax systems as well as specific tax accounting principles. At that time, the 
Working Group had decided to take an “informal approach” on this matter 
and not to formulate a catalogue of tax principles.71 Later experts became 
uneasy when they realized that, without a minimum level of tax p rinciples, 
countries would resort to the national GAAP whenever CCCTB legislation 
was incomplete or unclear.72 This led to the insertion of Art. 9, which contains 
general tax principles to assist in the interpretation of the CCCTB proposal 
and to eliminate the need for national legislation and legal practice. Whether 
the four principles of Art.   9    the  realization  principle,  the  individual 
measurement  of  transactions  and  taxable  events,  consistency  in  the 
calculation of the tax base, the concept of tax years  can live up to these 
expectations  remains  to  be  seen.  Principles  play  such  a  crucial  role  in 
achieving  the  goal  of  harmonization  since  a  European  Tax  Court  is  not 
envisioned by the CCCTB proposal and common rules will be of no avail if 
their interpretation differs considerably under the auspices of national judges 
and  tax  inspectors.73  The  analysis  of  the  extent  to  which  overarching 
unwritten principles can be derived from the detailed rules of the proposal is 
at any rate an avenue for future research.74  
 
 
III. OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSAL IN LIGHT OF A CCTB 
WITHOUT CONSOLIDATION 
 
A. Optionality & personal scope 
Art. 6 of the proposal stipulates that the application of the CCCTB is 
optional.75 Once the system has been successfully opted into, it has to be 
applied for a minimum period of five tax years. 76 On closer inspection one 
can find a multitude of pros and cons regarding optionality when discussing 
a  CCCTB  as  well  as a  CCTB. 77  However, the  balance  between  those 
arguments might change in light of a CCTB with out consolidation and 
formula  apportionment  compared  with  a  CCCTB.  Whilst  the  CCCTB 
proposal  provides  optionality,  the  federal  government  of  Germany  for 
instance favours a CCTB that is mandatory. 78The list of pros and cons of 
optionality can be divided into the positive and negative arguments that hold 
true for both a CCCTB and a CCTB and those that differ on this point. To the 
former group belongs the following line of argumentation. 79  Optionality 
minimizes the risk of a non-competitive system80 and it prevents the drifting 
                                                 
71  CCCTB  Working  Group,  ‘Progress  to  date  and  future  plans  for  the  CCCTB’ 
CCCTB/WP/020/doc/en of 15 November 2005, 5. 
72  CCCTB  Working  Group,  ‘Various  detailed  aspects  of  the  CCCTB’ 
CCCTB/WP/066/doc/en of 27 March 2008, 2. 
73 Schön (n 55) 429. 
74 Insofar pessimistic: Marx (n 46) 550.  
75 See Kahle, Dahlke, Schulz (n 50) 592. 
76 CCCTB proposal, art 105, para. 1. 
77 The considerations of this subsection are based on Hey, ‘CCCTB  Optionality’ in Lang, 
Pistone, Schuch, Staringer (eds), CCCTB (Linde 2008) 93ff. 
78 See Bundestags-Drucksache 17/5748 of 5 May 2011, 1. 
79 See Hey (n 77) 102 ff. 
80 Since national systems would have to compete against the CCCTB/CCTB and vice versa. 2011]  DIRECT TAXATION IN THE EU: THE COMMON 
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apart  of  the  domestic  tax  base  and  the  CCCTB  /  CCTB.81  Furthermore, 
change is less fundamental and national sovereignty is not as severely 
restricted  as compared  with a mandatory CCCTB / CCTB. 82  SMEs in 
particular can avoid complications. Speaking against optionality are the high 
compliance costs of exercising the option,83 the administrative burden84 and 
opportunities for shopping between the two systems. 85 To the latter group 
belong the following arguments. On the one hand, the positive argument that 
an optional system avoids the necessity of an opening clause to the formula 
apportionment procedure holds true only for a CCCTB since a CCTB does 
not  feature  formula  apportionment. 86  On  the  other  hand,  the  negative 
arguments that optionality would perpetuate profit -shifting opportunities87 
and increase the budget risks of cross -border consolidation88 are likewise 
applicable only to a CCCTB and not to a CCTB. 89Furthermore, the above 
arguments have to be weighted differently depending on whether optionality 
is evaluated with regard to a CCCTB or a CCTB regime. While with a 
CCCTB it might be argued that the strongest argument against optionality is 
the elimination of profit shifting and that the compliance costs issue does not 
weigh as heavily in comparison,90 the optionality of a CCTB seems out of the 
question precisely due to the fact that this is the only way compliance costs 
can be reduced significantly, which is after all the main goal of  a CCTB.A 
question closely related to optionality is the personal scope of a CCCTB / 
CCTB.91 As its name suggests, the proposed CCCTB is limited to entities that 
are subject to corporate tax law, thus excluding partnerships that are flow -
through entities.92 Henceforth, the system is not neutral regarding legal form. 
If it were mandatory, the only way out for companies would be to reorganize 
into partnerships. Even though this appears at first  glance as  a strong 
                                                 
81 This seems especially important when considering that at least according to the CCCTB 
proposal partnerships would not be eligible for a CCCTB/CCTB. 
82 Nevertheless, member states could not prevent companies from opting for the new system. 
83 A CCCTB / CCTB would add the 28 th system to the already existing 27 national ones. 
Taxpayers would face the highly complex decision whether they should opt or not. 
84  The option requirements as well as the changes between systems would have to be 
controlled by tax authorities. Moreover, two sets of rules would have to be applied at the 
same time. 
85 Although the five year minimum period hampers constant opting in and out and under a 
CCTB regime the opportunity of shopping between the national GAAP and the CCTB would 
not include the choice between unitary accounting and separate entity accounting as is the 
case with a CCCTB but be confined to a choice between two sets of rules determin ing the 
tax base. 
86 However, the CCCTB proposal  even contains an opening clause  for cases where the 
application of the formula leads to an unreasonable allocation of the group’s profits (Art. 86) 
although the regime would be optional. 
87 A mandatory CCCTB would eliminate the problem of transfer price tax planning within 
the EU since  intra-group transactions would be eliminated by means of consolidation, 
whereas an optional CCCTB would still leave the taxpayer with the choice to stick to separate 
entity accounting. 
88 Taxpayers for which the CCCTB is advantageous will opt and those for which it is not will 
refrain from opting.  
89 Hey (n 77) 104ff, 108. 
90 ibid 111. 
91 ibid 100ff. 
92 CCCTB proposal, art. 1-3, Annexes I, II. Also see Staringer, ‘Requirements for Forming a 
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argument  for  an  optional  system  that  reduces  such  distortions,93  only a 
mandatory system is capable of truly reducing compliance costs. In order to 
avoid distortions    and  also  the  administrative  burden  of  applying  two 
systems at the same time  the personal scope of a compulsory CCTB would 
therefore have to include partnerships as flow-through entities,94 creating a 
“Common Entrepreneurial Tax Base” (CETB) or something similar.95 
 
B.  Methods and scope of consolidation 
The  tax-specific  consolidation  technique  of  the  CCCTB  proposal 
abandons three out of the four financial accounting consolidation methods.96 
Since the tax base envisaged by the proposal is based on the profit and loss 
approach, capital consolidation, debt consolidation as well as consolidation 
of expenses and income do not apply.97 Only profits and losses arising from 
intra-group transactions have to be eliminated, which allows cross -border 
losses to be offset and disarms the explosiveness of transfer pricing. 98 Even 
though a CCTB or a CETB does not provide these advantages, intra -group 
profit and loss elimination should still apply within the framework of a 
national group taxation system. This is because intra-group transfers of goods 
and provisions of services should not have an impact on the overall amount 
of taxable profits since the associated pro fits and losses have yet to be 
realized. The realization principle requires that goods or services already be 
transferred to the market. 99According to the CCCTB proposal, a resident 
taxpayer forms a group with all its qualifying subsidiaries and permanent 
establishments located in a EU Member State.100 This is often referred to as 
“all-in-or-all-out” principle, which is designed to forestall cherry picking.101 
Territorially, the scope of consolidation is limited to the “water’s edge”, that 
is, third-party countries are not included.102 Qualifying subsidiaries are all 
immediate and lower-tier subsidiaries of whose voting rights the parent 
company has the right to exercise more than 50 % and with reference to which 
the parent company owns more than 75% of the capital or the rights giving 
entitlement to profit.103The CCCTB proposal’s definition of the consolidation 
scope is based exclusively on legal criteria.104 Indeed, economic criteria were 
                                                 
93 Hey (n 77) 100ff. 
94 For example, the Federal Council of Germany favours an inclusion of all partnerships in 
the personal scope of a CCCTB (Bundesrat-Drucksache 155/11(B)(2) of 17 July 2011, p. 1). 
In Germany, most business enterprises have the legal form of a partnership. 
95 Herzig, ‘Vorschlag einer GKKB-RL’ (n 13). 
96 See Herzig, ‘Tax Harmonization in Europe: Methods of Consolidation’ in Lang, Pistone, 
Schuch, Staringer  (n 77) 556. 
97 See Kahle, Dahlke, Schulz (n 50) 497ff. 
98 CCCTB proposal (n1), art. 59. 
99 See Kahle, Dahlke, Schulz (n 50) 498. 
100 CCCTB proposal (n 1), art. 55. 
101  Since the taxpayer can only opt into the system together with all of its qualifying 
subsidiaries and permanent establishments within the EU and not just together with those for 
whom the application of the system is advantageous (Kußmaul, Niehren, ‘Die Gemeinsame 
Konsolidierte Körperschaftsteuer-Bemessungsgrundlage in der Europäischen Union’ [2011] 
Der Steuerberater 346). 
102 Herzig, Teschke, Joisten (n 35) 341ff. 
103 CCCTB proposal (n 1), art. 54. 
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left out of consideration by the CCCTB Working Group.105 The decision for 
legal  thresholds  for  consolidation  clearly  comes  with  the advantage  of 
administrative  simplicity.106  Yet  it  poses  the  problem  of  manipulation. 
Integration of a given entity into a CCCTB group could be actively governed 
by manipulating the legal consolidation thresholds, depending on whether a 
higher portion of profit could be shifted to low -tax jurisdictions by either 
formula allocation or manipulation of transfer prices. While economic criteria 
might be less vulnerable to consolidation, their downside is that they are to a 
certain degree subjective, possibly giving rise to a conflict between taxpayers 
and tax authorities and thereby resulting in administrative complexity. 107 
Naturally, this quandary is avoided completely by a mandatory CCTB / 
CETB.108 
C.  Formula apportionment & one-stop shop 
Some of the drawbacks of formula apportionment were touched upon 
above when it was questioned whether unitary taxation was indeed a panacea. 
In addition to the problem of its vulnerability to tax planning and its likeliness 
to  trigger  economic  distortions,  one  of  the  major  challenges  of  gaining 
political support for a CCCTB after introducing a CCTB / CETB lies in 
finding a formula that is perceived as balanced and fair by the member states, 
industries and taxpayers alike. While a one-factor formula might be easier to 
manage, the three-factor model chosen in Art. 86 of the CCCTB proposal 
reflects the generation of income more adequately.109 However, the weighting 
as well as the design of labour, asset and sales factors will probably be put to 
further discussion. For instance, a complaint often voiced is that the exclusion 
of intangible and financial assets puts member states with large service 
industries and high levels of productivity at a disadvantage, whereas labour-
intensive economies would benefit unduly.110 If the four industry-specific 
apportionment mechanisms contained in the proposal   regarding financial 
institutions, insurance undertakings, oil and gas as well as shipping and air 
transport  suffice to meet such concerns is doubtful.111Furthermore, the 
CCCTB proposal is based on the concept of a one-stop shop.112 According to 
this concept, the principal member of a group performs all administrative 
procedures on behalf of the whole group with its own tax authority. 113 This 
ranges from the notice to opt for the CCCTB regime (Arts. 104, 105) and the 
filing of the tax return (Arts. 109, 112) to the assessment by the tax authority 
(Arts. 112, 114), audits (Art. 112) and appeals (Ars. 124-126). If a CCTB / 
CETB were introduced, the idea of the one-stop shop for a EU-wide group 
                                                 
105 See Herzig, Teschke, Joisten (n 35) 337. 
106 Andersson, ‘An Optional CCCTB for the European Union’ in Andersson, Eberhartinger, 
Oxelheim (eds), National Tax Policy in Europe. To Be or Not to Be? (Springer 2007) 109. 
107 See Herzig, Teschke, Joisten (n 35) 337. 
108 Under an optional CETB regime, the integration of an entity into the group  (admittedly 
only within the framework of a national group  taxation system)  would probably still be 
manipulated depending on whether the national or the CETB’s set of rules for determining 
the tax base is beneficial for the specific entity in question. 
109 Kahle, Dahlke, Schulz (n 50) 500. 
110 Vascega, Thiel van (n 8) 380. 
111 CCCTB proposal (n 1), arts. 98-101. 
112 Kahle, Dahlke, Schulz (n 50) 502. 
113 Vascega, Thiel van (n 8) 376. 12  Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics  [Vol 1:2 
would have to be put aside for the time being until the supplementation of the 
CCTB / CETB regime with consolidation and formula apportionment.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Two major arguments militate for untying the full package of the 
CCCTB and focusing on a CCTB / CETB without consolidation and formula 
apportionment. On the one hand, member states’ political support is low, 
especially for the second and third steps of the project. This is amongst others 
evidenced by the fact that ten member states sent their reasoned opinions of 
the  proposal’s  non-compliance  with  the  principles  of  subsidiarity  and 
proportionality. There are signs, however, that some member states embrace 
the idea of a CCTB / CETB. On the other hand, formula apportionment is by 
no means a panacea since profit-shifting by transfer pricing would probably 
just be substituted by profit-shifting via manipulation of the apportionment 
formula. Economic decisions are also likely to be distorted under such a 
regime. Although a CCTB / CETB does not offer all the advantages of a 
CCCTB, it nevertheless results most notably in a significant reduction of 
compliance  and  administrative  costs    provided  that  its  application  is 
mandatory and that partnerships as flow-through entities are included in its 
personal scope. Naturally, the common set of rules for determining the tax 
base in the CCCTB proposal suggests itself as a point of departure for drafting 
a  CCTB  /  CETB.  The  provisions  relating  to  consolidation,  formula 
apportionment and the administrative idea of a one-stop shop will not be 
adopted for the time being. It is a positive sign that the proposal defines the 
tax base completely on its own without links to financial accounting, only 
adopting the ideas of IFRS / IAS when they are deemed by the Commission 
to be appropriate to the tax-specific goals of the project. In practice, however, 
it is likely that the financial accounting balance sheet and profit and loss 
account  will  serve  as  an  informal  starting  point  for  the  profit  and  loss 
approach chosen in the proposal. Furthermore, it is disputable whether the 
four principles listed in Art. 9 of the CCCTB proposal will be enough to assist 
in  the  interpretation  when  legislation  is  incomplete  or  unclear.  For  this 
purpose, overarching unwritten principles might be able to be derived from 
the detailed rules of the proposal.  
 